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Egalitarianism Versus Growthmanship 
I: INTRODUCTION 
The years 1968-69 have proved to be a watershed in Pakistan's history. 
They witnessed the first-ever successful national upheaval against an unrepresen-
tative though well-entrenched regime. At first sight the events of 1968-69 appear 
to have been touched off by a rising sentiment for the rule of law and the estab-
lishment in the country of a parliamentary democracy based on adult franchise. 
However, the political turmoil in Pakistan was sustained by the gross social 
injustices to which the people had been subjected. 
The main lesson that policy-makers and economists should learn f rom the 
social turbulence in 1968-69 in Pakistan is that a relentless drive for economic 
growth without due regard for social justice can spur a social revolution of the 
first order. It, therefore, follows that while economic growth might well be the 
basic objective of economic policy, government should also adopt specific 
measures to protect the majority of the people against the tyranny of a privileged 
minority. It may be unavoidable in a free-enterprise economy for a few inves-
tors to be the first recipients of a major part of the national wealth, but the 
State should ensure that they are not also the last recipients. The aim of govern-
ment policy should be not only to secure from each according to his ability but 
it must also provide to each according to his needs. 
The purpose of this article is to discover the true causes of the national 
upheaval in 1968-69 and to learn the right lessons f rom it. It shows in the 
second and third sections that policy-makers in Pakistan continue to distil their 
economic wisdom f rom the theories of some defunct economists of the distant 
past. Not only has the government tolerated the emergence of an unjust society; 
it in fact helped to perpetuate it by allowing wealth to concentrate in a few hands 
on the presumption that saving and investment in the economy would rise and the 
rate of economic growth be accelerated thereby. We attempt to show that such 
a policy has not only been unnecessary but utterly wasteful. Moreover, it has 
helped the growth of powerful vested interests in the society which will obstruct 
any changes in the status quo. 
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II. THE END OF EUPHORIA 
n.i 
The muted response of the general public in Pakistan up to 1968 to a 
policy of unbridled growthmanship had driven both politicians and the econo-
mists into making the false presumption that any economic solution to the pro-
blems of under-development could be imposed on the public with impunity. It 
was maintained, as is still done, that we should first grow and then redistribute, 
that we should try to enlarge the national cake before we could ever begin to have 
it distributed. Hence, a major portion of national savings should be ploughed 
into the build-up of physical capital. The development of human capital was 
seldom given the place it deserved. 
The theoretical underpinnings of such a policy derive from the assumption 
usually made in economics that the saving propensities of profit-earners and 
wage-earners are such that while the former tend to save the major part of their 
earnings, the latter tend to dissipate their earnings in consumption. Thus, it is 
contended that, if the maximisation of saving and investment is the primary goal 
of government policy, income should be allowed to concentrate in the pockets of 
profit-earners rather than go to wage-earners. This belief lies at the roots of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition of political economy, which has maintained since the days 
of Adam Smith that any attempt at redistributing income in favour of wage-
earners should simply provide them with the wherewithal to procreate rather 
than invest. 
This basic tenet of classical political economy is known as the Iron Law of 
Wages. It is so deep-rooted in traditional economic thought that economists 
have always tended to blame unemployment on a high level of wages. It has 
been maintained that if unemployment is to be reduced, all that can be done is 
to reduce the wages. It was this disdain for the social consequences of economic 
policy that prompted social philosophers like Carlyle to term economics the 
dismal science. This view was challenged by Keynes in the late thirties and 
since then economics has experienced a "change of heart" by incorporating 
welfare economics into the main corpus of economic theory. 
However, the men in authority in Pakistan still seem to distil their 
economic wisdom from the theories of some defunct economists, with the result 
that actual policy-making lags far behind developments in economic theory. 
The Iron Law of Wages, which inspired and guided the Industrial Revolution in 
1776 in Britain, still rules the roost. The guiding principle of economic policy 
is still the same: the share of profit earners must be made as large as possible 
while wages are kept to be a minimum; the goal of rapid industrial growth should 
be pursued relentlessly and ruthlessly, and the libertine spirit of the industrial 
sector remain unfettered. 
This policy has paid off in that, with the exception of Japan, Pakistan 
has recorded the highest rate of growth achieved by any country in the post-war 
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world. The large-scale manufacturing sector, which was nothing at the time of 
the partition of the sub-continent, has grown sharply at an average rate of 15 per 
cent or more since 1960, three times faster than the growth in GNP. As a result, 
the contribution of the large-scale manufacturing sector to Gross National 
Product had risen f rom 1 per cent in 1948-49 to about 10 per cent in 1969-70. 
However, while industrial growth has been remarkable, the incomes gap bet-
ween social classes has widened. It has been estimated that at present 29 in-
dustrial units control most of the industrial assets. There has also been a ten-
dency towards cartelization and monopolization in industry; industrialists not 
only own industrial assets but also control the major sources of finance —• e.g., 
they have their own insurance companies and their own banks. 
Furthermore, as discussed below, while wages have not been permitted to 
increase, no effort has ever been made to regulate the profit margins of the 
industrial investors. As a result, a privileged class of industrial elite has emer-
ged who owns palatial houses and big cars while nothing has been done to 
ameliorate the fast-deteriorating living standards of the working class. Such 
glaring disparities in the living standards of the rich and the poor have created an 
explosive social situation in Pakistan. The national disturbances of 1968-69 
dramatically demonstrated the untenability of such a policy of unbridled growth-
manship. Now, as never before, the popular demand is for a drastic social 
change. And it appears that without far-reaching reform in social and economic 
policies the very fabric of the Pakistani society may be torn asunder. 
n.2 
The root cause of the social maladies that have afflicted Pakistani society 
is that the government has let the private sector do the job of extracting the 
required investible surplus f rom the economy. The policy of the government 
has been to transfer real resources to the industrial investors f rom the rest of the 
economy. This policy objective has been magnificently accomplished through a 
complex economic manoeuvre. Firstly, as pointed out in the second section, 
while the investors have been given every incentive to save and invest on a large 
scale, a virtual freeze has been imposed on any wage increases. It has been 
estimated that for over 12 years f rom 1963 onwards, money wages have re-
mained virtually static while leal wages fell as the general price level rose. As a 
result, profits multiplied without limit. Secondly, this process of profit multiplica-
tion was further strengthened by stringent import restrictions which raised tre-
mendously the marginal profitability of new investment. With no effective sys-
tem of price controls in force, industrialists in Pakistan have grown in wealth 
without fear of foreign competition. While the industrialists have not been 
checked in the selfish pursuit of profit maximization, the common man has been 
forced to buy inferior quality and high-priced goods as a matter of patriotic duty. 
Thirdly, in order to enable the private sector to save on such a large scale, 
the existing tax structure has been heavily biased in favour of the industrial in-
vestor. The government policy has been to drug the industrialists with extra-
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strong fiscal and monetary incentives. Nowhere else in the world except, perhaps, 
in Germany, have the industrial "robber barons" been fed such large chunks of 
"mea t " at the expense of the public exchequer. Some of these fiscal incentives 
have been: differential tax in favour of paying dividends — 10 per cent off the 
corporate of 45 per cent; a rebate of personal income tax for investment in 
securities, so that a man with Rs. 30,000 of income can get 40 per cent on such 
investment up to Rs. 12,000; dividend income is exempted from tax up to 
new industrial ventures get Rs. 5,000, a six-year tax holiday, and so on. 
Are all of these incentives really necessary to keep the wheels of industry 
turning at an ever-increasing pace? My contention is that, whatever may have 
been the justification for pursuing such a policy in the past, a continuation or, 
even a worse, a reinforcement of it in the future, is both unnecessary and waste-
ful. Such a multiplicity of tax exemption and concessions have seriously eroded 
the tax base and have eased considerably the strain on human ingenuity to evade 
tax payment. Furthermore, such losses to the public exchequer may not have 
been offset by additional tax revenues f rom increased production in the manu-
facturing sector. After all, we already have cases of excess industrial capacity 
and over-capitalisation in certain lines of production, in other words of a 
misallocation of resources. Besides, tax incentives are only one of the several 
determinants of investment. Most important of them all is the availability of 
foreign exchange which sets an upper limit to the extent to which additional 
investment can be undertaken. If tax incentives are given without regard to the 
availability of foreign exchange, they merely lead to more money going into the 
pockets of the investors rather than into more investment, and into conspicuous 
consumption. There are strong reasons to suspect that this is what has been 
happening in Pakistan. 
The main point that I want to make is that the strategy of unbridled (or 
not adequately bridled) laisser faire is bound to bias income distribution heavily 
in favour of a small group of investors. Government policy is then reduced to 
coaxing, cajoling and not infrequently to begging this small group of investors to 
use this additional money for productive investment. The belief that it is possible 
to redistribute after the growth process has gone far enough is at best naive, and 
at least downright pernicious. For in the process of economic growth powerful 
vested interests also grow, and they tend to resist any change in the status quo. 
The latest example of such resistance by pressure groups in Pakistan is their 
reluctance to really enforce the minimum wage law in both letter and spirit. The 
frequency of strikes by industrial workers who can hardly "afford" to do so 
unless they are really pushed to the wall, is another example of the dangers of 
letting the "dog" sleep undisturbed for too long. The basic point is that 
inequality of income is NOT a pre-requisite for additional saving and investment. 
n.3 
The recent developments in economic theory do not support the hypothesis 
that income inequality, such as has been consciously promoted by the govern-
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ment in Pakistan, is a pre-requisite of economic growth. Several arguments can-
be advanced against such a hypothesis. Firstly, the hypothesis that inequalities 
of income have to be tolerated as a necessary evil in order to make it possible for 
the capitalist to do the job of extracting the required investible surplus f rom the 
economy is ill-founded in theory and makes the economic process appear 
unnecessarily forbidding and devoid of any sympathetic concern for social 
suffering. The hypothesis is ill-founded in theory because it assumes that there is 
only one way of extracting the required investible surplus from the economy. 
However, the government can also do this job, and there is a presumption that 
it can do this job at a much lower cost to the society. Hence, in order to estab-
lish the superiority of the private sector, one must compare the costs of collecting 
and redistributing economic resources among various classes by the government 
with the cost of relying mainly on the private sector. It can easily be shown that 
whereas the policy of relying on the private sector to generate the investible 
surplus imposes both production and consumption costs on the economy, no such 
costs are involved if the government acts as a redistributive agent. 
Secondly, the belief that investors today would reinvest whatever they 
earn above a reasonable standard and would lead an ascetic life ignores the force 
of the demonstration effect on consumption levels —- the Duesenbury hypothesis 
— which operates both at a national and at an international level. The appeals 
of government to the conscience of profit-motivated investors did find a favour-
able echo with the investors of the 18th century Britain and the early settlers of 
America, mainly because they were not yet exposed to the corrupting influence of 
conspicuous consumption. A touch of puritanism may also have induced these 
pioneering investors to reinvest dutifully rather than indulge in the baser occu-
pations of luxurious living. But the contemporary investor, unlike his (spiritual) 
ancestors, has to resist the more compelling temptation of owning consumer 
durables and big houses, while at the same time puritanism has spent its force, 
if it ever was much of a force. The ownership of excessive wealth provides 
strong incentive to indulge in conspicuous consumption. 
Thirdly, even if investors do reinvest more than they squander, "self 
financing" by the investors leads to a misallocation of resources via over-capita-
lization and excess industrial capacity, which in turn adversely affect long-term 
growth rates. Fourthly, the above hypothesis ignores the fact that gains in pro-
ductivity are linked not only with investment in physical capital but also with 
investment in human capital — healthy labour is as much a force for economic 
growth as increments in physical capital. 
It follows that if the government persists with the policy of unbridled 
growthmanship then the society must accept a large-scale deflection of the 
resources put at the disposal of a small class of the society into wasteful ex-
penditure on big cars and palatial houses as a necessary price of economic growth. 
This is of course a very high price particularly because the social gains in the form 
of additional investment fall far short of the cost to the society in allocative 
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inefficiency and social unrest which, if suppressed for too long, leads to upheavals 
like the one the country experienced in 1968-69. Furthermore, not noly that 
there is no necessary link between inequalities of income and economic growth, 
but that such inequalities may in fact generate forces which may ultimately hinder 
the process of economic growth itself by encouraging conspicuous consumption 
and by promoting a misallocation of resources. 
As a matter of fact, a strong case can be made for the proposition that a 
just and socially acceptable distribution of income may release much stronger 
forces for economic growth than an equitable system would, for it would induce 
the public to cooperate with the government more effectively. Such mutual 
confidence between public and government is the basic requirement for making 
a democratic system of government, such as we are trying to establish in 
Pakistan, work for the good of the people. If people coud see that they get 
tangible collective benefits greater than their individual tax contributions, the 
payment of taxes would no longer be considered as unwanted burden to be 
thrown off at the slightest pretext but as a citizen's obligation to society and to 
himself. 
Furthermore, a greater mutual confidence would enable the government 
to make more effective use of its fiscal powers. This is because when wealth is 
more evenly distributed the monetary incentive to evade taxes is considerably 
weakened. The smaller individual tax liability would not justify the time, money 
and effort now spent on devising successful schemes of tax evasion. While 
taxation experts will lose clients and money, society's chances of betterment 
will improve. With a more equal distribution of income, government would 
also be able to reduce considerably the top marginal tax rates because of a 
broadening of the tax base. As a result, while incentives to save and invest will 
become greater because of a lower marginal tax rate on the top income brackets, 
government will also acquire greater financial lesources for spending on social 
welfare. 
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III. WHERE THE RAINBOW ENDS 
in . l 
It directly follows from our analysis that in order to undo social injustices 
and to provide a just dispensation to society, the government must take over f rom 
the private sector the job of extracting the required investible surplus f rom the 
economy and adopt policies to rein in the private sector. As a first step, the 
government must withdraw all the wasteful fiscal incentives that it at present 
grants to the private sector. Every effort should be made to broaden the tax 
base and to destroy at the very source the incentive to evade taxes. Fiscal 
policy should be used more effectively as a mobilizer of private resources to the 
public sector. These additional resources will then be available for achieving 
the egalitarian objectives of social policy. In sum, taxation policy must be 
restored to the service of public welfare. It should not be allowed to remain 
a symbol of the exploitation of the poor by the rich, with the government being 
an accessory to the crime. 
Furthermore, the government must take specific steps to compensate the 
losers in the society. This means that the government will have to play a bigger 
and a more effective role in leading the economy towards a more just social order. 
For, the basic aim of government policy must then be to maximise social welfare. 
This would require that government adopt two distinct set of policies, first, to 
make private investment flow into socially desirable channels of production; 
and second, to regulate relative consumption levels among social classes. While 
the first set of policies will be needed to correct a socially suboptimal pattern of 
production, the second set of policies will be required to satisfy requirements of 
equity in relative consumption standards. In other words, any democratic 
government worth its salt must not only secure " f rom every one according to 
his ability", but also provide " to every one according to his needs". Many 
economists in this country, though not all, may be alarmed at these suggestions, 
and dub them communist and what not. However, it can be easily shown that 
under fairly broad assumptions these general principles follow directly from the 
two basic rules of welfare economics —• i.e., firstly, production should be extended 
in various branches of production in such a way as to equalise marginal social 
productivities among them and, secondly, the distribution of income among 
consumers must be such as to equalise the marginal utilities of consumer goods 
among all consumers. The satisfaction of these rules will ensure the maximisa-
tion of social welfare. It is important to note that these rules are perfectly 
neutral and one need not assume socialism, capitalism or any other " ism" for their 
realization. However, whatever the political framework, basic social institutions 
must be created to ensure the fulfilment of each of these principles. There is no 
denying the fact that it would take a lot of human ingenuity to create and operate 
such institutions, but then what would the acquisition of knowledge do if it 
were not spent in devising ways and means of alleviating human sufferings. 
Pure economic theroy tells us that in the event of a divergence between 
social and private benefits or costs, the market will fail to perform its allocative 
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function optimally. In such a case, the State must intervene in order to maximise 
social welfare. The optimal form — i.e., in a special sense, the "best" form —-
of state intervention under such circumstances is a subsidy to those industries 
where the gain to society f rom additional investments exceeds the gain to the 
private investor. The government must also impose a tax on socially undesir-
able investment, the basic principle being that the government must aim at 
equalising marginal productivities in different lines of production. If this is done 
the gain to society f rom productive activity will be optimized. 
However, it is important to note that an appropriate tax-a/w-subsidy 
scheme designed to regulate productive activity in the country only is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of social justice — i.e., it cannot by itself 
achieve a social optimum. For the system of laisser faire fails in a more fund-
amental way as to achieve distributive justice: the market mechanism makes no 
provision for the institution which could equalise marginal utilities among con-
sumers. In order to correct this failing, a redistribution of income in favour of 
the losers is required. It has been suggested that such a redistribution of income 
can be affected, among other things, by making the tax structure more progressive 
—• that is, by raising the proportion of direct to indirect taxes. But a tax on 
income affects work incentives and hence is only a second-best solution. On the 
other hand, taxes on wealth and on capital gains do not affect incentives and 
constitute an optimal solution. Of course, the optimal solution may be impossi-
ble to achieve, and one would have to settle with the second-best. But whatever 
it is, an ambitious social security programme remains the main policy instrument 
for achieving distributive justice; for every citizen of the country, whether 
employed or unemployed, whether able-bodied or old and sick, should be pro-
vided with a minimum income. 
m.2 
The reader may have wondered whether we are advocating the complete 
socialization of society in Pakistan. This is not the case. It can be shown that 
the government can ensure social justice without complete ownership of all 
the means of production. The important thing is that the government should 
regulate the private sector adequately and properly. The model for Pakistan 
is not a completely regimented economy where the State acts as a supreme over-
load and is invested with arbitrary powers to coerce the individuals into following 
a pre-established course of action; nor is it a completely free-enterprise economy 
where a few enterprizing individuals run the economy for the government. 
Such systems may be perfectly suitable for the countries in which they originated 
and flowered; but the ideal for Pakistan should be to move towards a welfare 
state in which, while the citizens enjoy all the civil liberties guaranteed by a demo-
cratic government, there exist enough safeguards against the tyranny of powerful 
vested^ interests, whose growth in a democratic society is almost natural. 
Pakistan can draw inspiration f rom the experience of Scandinavian 
countries like Norway and Sweden. For decades now the policy-makers in these 
countries, unlike our own, have not felt impelled to make a choice between equity 
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and growth. The impulse to alleviate social suffering has been so strong that 
economic policies have been framed to achieve high growth rates while also 
satisfying the "equity constraint". As a result, these countries, by making 
judicious use of government's vast coercive powers, have succeeded in establish-
ing a just society, while growth rates of 5 per cent or so have been maintained 
— all without curtailing individual civil liberties. The experience of these 
countries should make us pause and think. It is no argument to say that the 
government in Pakistan, as in other under-developed countries, is, of its very na-
ture, corrupt and inefficient. Even if such, in fact, is the case, it is no argument 
for surrendering government authority to the "invisible hand" of the market but 
underscores the urgency of improving the efficiency of government. For, with-
out a strong and efficient government democracy could become the tool of a 
few exploiters. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The upshot of our analysis is that the conflict between growth and dis-
tributive justice is nothing like a law of nature. It is a conflict in appearance 
only which arises mainly f rom our unquestioning belief that the monopolistic 
profit-maximiser must be given his pound of flesh in order to attain high rates 
of economic growth. We have shown that such a belief is at best naive, if not 
downright pernicious. It is based on out-of-date economic deoctrines and is a 
hangover f rom the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century. It is clearly 
anachronistic today when sentiment generally favours a welfare state. 
The ultimate test of economic policy is the contribution it makes to the 
alleviation of social suffering. Granted economic growth will lead to higher 
welfare in the future and that the present generation must suffer. But why should 
a few enterprising individuals be allowed to acquire and keep excessive wealth 
and bathe in the warm glow of luxurious living while the major part of the popu-
lation remains stuck in a quagmire of shameful poverty? It is only fair that 
the economically strong be made to pay for the economically weak. For Govern-
ment must not only secure " f rom each according to his ability", but also provide 
" to each according to his needs". A democratic government, such as we are 
trying to establish in Pakistan, must satisfy both these social principles simulta-
neously in order to justify its existence. 
Futhermore, even if it is true that the present generation must suffer for 
posterity's sake, care should be taken in apportioning the burdens of economic 
growth between the present and the future generation. For, it is the lure of 
tangible benfits in the present generation rather than the promise of an El Dorado 
for posterity that acts as a centripetal force in human affairs. You can temper 
this egoism a little, but any effort to alter it too much would certainly evoke a 
hostile social response. Society, and the individuals composing it, cannot be ex-
pected to indulge in acts of self-sacrifice entirely for the benefit of posterity, and 
certainly not for the benefit of the privileged few. N o propaganda machine 
could ever enlist the whole-hearted cooperation of the public in the cause of 
economic growth if all it did was to promise a glittering future. 
We must never forget that the centre of all our economic activity is Man 
himself. We need to understand that economic processes do not take place in a 
vacuum but involve living humanbeings who cannot be used as guinea pigs for 
economic experimentation. The State must provide for national welfare before it 
can hope to start off a vigorous and self-sustaining process of economic growth. 
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